propositio 42 Pars 2, prop 42 |
Latin | Appuhn - fr | Stern - de | Peri - it | Suchtelen - nl | Peña - es | Misrahi - fr | | alto ^ |
Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the, false.
Secundi et tertii et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.
Secundi et tertii et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.
La connaissance du deuxième genre et du troisième, non celle du premier genre, nous enseigne à distinguer le vrai du faux. (Appuhn - fr)
Die Erkenntnis zweiter und dritter Gattung, nicht die Erkenntnis erster Gattung, lehrt uns das Wahre vom Falschen unterscheiden. (Stern - de)
La conoscenza del secondo e del terzo genere ci insegna a distinguere il vero dal falso; non così la conoscenza del primo genere. (Peri - it)
Niet de kennis van de eerste, maar die van de tweede en derde soort leeren ons waarheid van valschheid onderscheiden. (Suchtelen - nl)
El conocimiento del segundo y tercer género, y no el del primero, nos enseña a distinguir lo verdadero de lo falso. (Peña - es)
C'est la connaissance du second et du troisième genre, et non celle du premier genre qui nous apprend à distinguer le vrai du faux. (Misrahi - fr)
demonstratio by 2, prop 40, sc 2
Latin | Appuhn - fr | Stern - de | Peri - it | Suchtelen - nl | Peña - es | Misrahi - fr
2, prop 42, demo - This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
2, prop 42, demo - Haec propositio per se patet. Qui enim inter verum et falsum scit distinguere, debet adaequatam veri et falsi habere ideam hoc est (per II scholium propositionis 40 hujus) verum et falsum secundo aut tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.
2, prop 42, demo - Cette proposition est évidente par elle-même. Qui sait distinguer, en effet, entre le vrai et le faux, doit avoir du vrai et du faux une idée adéquate, c'est-à-dire (Scolie 2 de la Prop. 40) connaître le vrai et le faux par le deuxième genre de connaissance ou le troisième. (Appuhn - fr)
2, prop 42, demo - Dieser Lehrsatz erhellt von selbst. Denn wer zwischen demWahren und Falschen zu unterscheiden weiß, muß eine adäquate Idee des Wahren und Falschen haben; d.h. (nach der 2. Anmerkung zu Lehrsatz 40 dieses Teils), er muß das Wahre und Falsche nach der zweiten oder dritten Erkenntnisgattung erkennen. (Stern - de)
2, prop 42, demo - Questa Proposizione è evidente per se stessa. Chi infatti sa distinguere fra il vero e il falso deve avere un'idea adeguata del vero e del falso, cioè (P. II, Chiarim. 2° d. Prop. 40) deve conoscere il vero e il falso mediante il secondo o il terzo genere di conoscenza. (Peri - it)
2, prop 42, demo - Deze Stelling is vanzelf duidelijk. Immers wie tusschen waarheid en valschheid weet te onderscheiden, moet een adaequate voorstelling hebben omtrent wat waar of valsch is, d.w.z. (vlg. Opmerking II St. XL v.d. D.) hij moet waarheid en valschheid kennen met de kennis van de tweede of derde soort. (Suchtelen - nl)
2, prop 42, demo - Esta Proposición es evidente por sí misma. En efecto: quien sabe distinguir entre lo verdadero y lo falso debe tener una idea adecuada de lo verdadero y lo falso, esto es (por el Escolio 2 de la Proposición 40 de esta Parte), conocer lo verdadero y lo falso por el segundo o el tercer género de conocimiento. (Peña - es)
2, prop 42, demo - Cette Proposition est évidente par elle-même. En effet, celui qui sait distinguer le vrai et le faux doit avoir une idée adéquate du vrai et du faux; c'est-à-dire (par le Scolie 2 de la Proposition 40), qu'il doit connaître le vrai et le faux par le second ou le troisième genre de connaissance. (Misrahi - fr)
2, prop 40, sc 2 - From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.
But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.