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propositio 27

Pars 4, prop 27
Latin | Appuhn - fr | Stern - de | Peri - it | Suchtelen - nl | Peña - es | Pautrat - fr | Misrahi - fr     infra (7)  |  haut ^

We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding.

Nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit vel quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus.

Nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit vel quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus.

Il n'est aucune chose que nous sachions avec certitude être bonne ou mauvaise, sinon ce qui conduit réellement à la connaissance ou peut empêcher que nous ne la possédions. (Appuhn - fr)

Nur von dem, was in Wahrheit zur Erkenntnis fahrt oder uns an der Erkenntnis hindert, wissen wir gewiß, daß es gut oder schlecht ist. (Stern - de)

Nessuna cosa c'è che noi sappiamo con certezza essere buona o cattiva, salvo ciò che realmente ci conduce alla conoscenza [(cosa buona)] e ciò che può impedirci di conoscere [(cosa cattiva)]. (Peri - it)

Van niets weten wij met zekerheid dat het goed of kwaad is, dan van datgene wat inderdaad tot begrip leidt, of wat ons begrip kan belemmeren. (Suchtelen - nl)

Con certeza, sólo sabemos que es bueno o malo aquello que conduce realmente al conocimiento, o aquello que puede impedir que conozcamos. (Peña - es)

Nous ne savons avec certitude être bien ou mal que ce qui sert véritablement à comprendre, ou ce qui peut nous empêcher de comprendre. (Pautrat - fr)

Nous ne connaissons avec certitude rien qui soit un bien ou un mal, si ce n’est ce qui conduit réellement à la compréhension, ou ce qui peut nous empêcher de comprendre. (Misrahi - fr)

demonstratio par 4, prop 26  |  2, prop 41  |  2, prop 43  |  2, prop 43, sc   |  2, prop 40, sc 1  |  2, prop 40, sc 2

Latin | Appuhn - fr | Stern - de | Peri - it | Suchtelen - nl | Peña - es | Misrahi - fr

4, prop 27, demo  - The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the mind (II. xli. xliii. and note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.

4, prop 27, demo  - Mens quatenus ratiocinatur nihil aliud appetit quam intelligere nec aliud sibi utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per propositionem praecedentem). At mens (per propositiones 41 et 43 partis II, cujus etiam scholium vide) rerum certitudinem non habet nisi quatenus ideas habet adaequatas sive (quod per scholia propositionis 40 partis II idem est) quatenus ratiocinatur; ergo nihil certo scimus bonum esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit et contra id malum quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus. Q.E.D.

4, prop 27, demo  - L'Âme, en tant que raisonnable, n'appète rien d'autre que la connaissance, et ne juge pas qu'aucune chose lui soit utile, sinon ce qui conduit à la connaissance (Prop. préc.). Mais l'Âme (Prop. 41 et 43, p. II, dont on verra aussi le Scolie) n'a de certitude au sujet des choses qu'en tant qu'elle a des idées adéquates, ou (ce qui, par le Scolie 2 de la Prop, 40, p. II, revient au même) en tant qu'elle est raisonnable. Donc il n'est aucune chose que nous sachions avec certitude être bonne pour nous, sinon ce qui conduit réellement à la connaissance ; et aucune chose que nous sachions au contraire mauvaise, sinon ce qui empêche que nous ne possédions la connaissance. C.Q.F.D. (Appuhn - fr)

4, prop 27, demo  - Der Geist, sofern er vernunftgemäß denkt, verlangt nichts anderes als das Erkennen und beurteilt nur das als für ihn nützlich, was zur Erkenntnis führt (nach dem vorigen Lehrsatz). Der Geist aber hat (nach den Lehrsätzen 41 und 43, Teil 2, s. auch dessen Anmerkung) nur Gewißheit über die Dinge, sofern er adäquate Ideen hat oder (was nach Zusatz zu Lehrsatz 40, Teil 2, dasselbe ist) sofern er vernunftgemäß denkt. Also wissen wir nur von dem gewiß, daß es gut ist, was in Wahrheit zur Erkenntnis führt, und umgekehrt wissen wir nur von dem, daß es schlecht ist, was uns an der Erkenntnis hindert. -W.z.b.w. (Stern - de)

4, prop 27, demo  - La Mente, in quanto pensa razionalmente, non appetisce altro che il conoscere, e non giudica utile a se stessa se non ciò che conduce alla conoscenza. Mala Mente non ha la certezza delle cose se non in quanto ha idee adeguate, ossia in quanto pensa razionalmente (queste due espressioni si equivalgono: v. P. II, Chiarim. 2° d. Prop. 40): e dunque non c'è nulla che noi sappiamo con certezza essere buono salvo ciò che realmente ci conduce alla conoscenza; e, viceversa, non c'è nulla che noi sappiamo con certezza essere cattivo salvo ciò che può impedirci di conoscere. (P. II, Prop. 41; Prop. 43 e suo Chiarim.; P. IV, Prop. 26). (Peri - it)

4, prop 27, demo  - Voorzoover hij redelijk denkt, verlangt de Geest niets anders dan begrijpen en houdt hij niets anders voor nuttig dan datgene, wat tot begrip leidt (vlg. voorgaande St.). Maar de Geest heeft (vlg. St. XLI en XLIII D. II; zie ook de Opmerking daarbij) geenerlei zekerheid omtrent de dingen, dan voorzoover hij adaequate voorstellingen heeft, ofwel (wat vlg. Opmerking St. XL D. II hetzelfde is) voorzoover hij redelijk denkt. Derhalve weten wij van niets met zekerheid dat het goed is, dan van datgene, wat inderdaad tot begrip leidt, en omgekeerd dat het kwaad is, dan van datgene wat ons begrip kan belemmeren. H.t.b.w. (Suchtelen - nl)

4, prop 27, demo  - El alma, en cuanto que raciocina, no apetece otra cosa que conocer, y no juzga útil nada más que lo que la lleva al conocimiento (por la Proposición anterior). Ahora bien, el alma (por las Proposiciones 41 y 43 de la Parte II; ver también el Escolio de esta última) no posee certeza acerca de las cosas sino en la medida en que tiene ideas adecuadas, o sea (lo que es lo mismo, por el Escolio 2 de la Proposición 40 de la Parte II), en la medida en que raciocina. Por consiguiente, sólo sabemos con certeza que es bueno aquello que conduce realmente al conocimiento, y, al contrario, que es malo aquello que puede impedir que conozcamos. Q.E.D. (Peña - es)

4, prop 27, demo  - L’Esprit, en tant qu’il raisonne, ne poursuit rien d’autre que le fait de comprendre, et ne juge pas qu’autre chose lui soit utile que ce qui conduit à la compréhension (par la Proposition précédente). Mais l’Esprit (par les Propositions 41 et 43, Partie II, dont on verra aussi le Scolie) n’a de certitude sur les choses qu’en tant qu’il a des idées adéquates, ou (ce qui est la même chose par le Scolie 2 de la Proposition 40, Partie II) en tant qu’il raisonne. Donc, nous ne connaissons avec certitude rien qui soit un bien si ce n’est ce qui conduit réellement à la compréhension, et au contraire rien qui soit un mal si ce n’est ce qui peut nous empêcher de comprendre. C.Q.F.D. (Misrahi - fr)

4, prop 26 - Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding.

2, prop 41 - Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

2, prop 43 - He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.

2, prop 43, sc  - I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has true ideas have any advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question--as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object--in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.

2, prop 40, sc 1 - I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll. and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination breakdown, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.
It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

2, prop 40, sc 2 - From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.
But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.

utilisé(e) par : 4, prop 28, demo   |  4, prop 38, demo   |  4, prop 40, demo   |  4, prop 48, demo   |  4, prop 50, demo   |  5, prop 9, demo   |  5, prop 10, demo 

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